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PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE SUPREME 
COURT: JUSTICE TOM CLARK'S 
OPINION IN THE SCHOOL 
PRAYER CASE 
Thomas M. Mengler* 
As Frederick Schauer observes, little empirical evidence exists 
that the Supreme Court ever consciously drafts an opinion for its 
likely audience. To be sure, Schauer notes, the audience frequently 
varies. Often, only lower courts and attorneys advising business cli-
ents are watching, while at other times officials for state and local 
governments are the primary audience. Sometimes a case might 
pique the curiosity of the academic world, while on other occasions 
the whole world-or at least the American public-seems to be 
watching. But, Schauer complains, the audience rarely if ever af-
fects the manner of the message. Schauer's Court-watching has led 
him to conclude that "serious thought about this issue, let alone 
how to address these people once we decide who they are, seems 
conspicuously absent from the Supreme Court's processes." In 
Schauer's mind the Court's inattentiveness to its audience is unfor-
tunate: "it would seem sensible, once it was decided what the Court 
was going to do and how it was going to do it, for the Court to 
devote some time to drafting an opinion that tried to talk to those to 
whom the opinion ought to talk." 1 
I do not quarrel with Schauer's conclusion about the Court's 
tendency to neglect its readership. As an inductive generalization, 
Schauer's thesis is probably correct. My project is more modest and 
specific. I will focus on just one counterexample to Schauer's thesis, 
which is Justice Tom Clark's majority opinion in the school prayer 
case, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp.2 The histori-
cal evidence shows that Justice Clark very consciously addressed 
the Schempp opinion to its primary audience, the ordinary citizen. 
* Associate Professor of Law. University of Illinois. A version of this article was 
presented at a Symposium on the Tom C. Clark Papers on March 19, 1985. I wish to thank 
my research assistant, Leonard Sachs, for his help. 
I. Schauer, Book Review, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 687 (1986). 
2. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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Now, twenty-five years after the event, some may forget why 
Justice Clark was so strongly motivated in Schempp to engage in 
public relations. A year earlier, the Court had decided Engel v. 
Vitale,3 holding unconstitutional the New York public school re-
gents' recommendation that school children recite a school prayer. 
The public outcry over Engel, although in the end ineffective, had 
threatened to rip the political structure from its moorings. Indeed, 
in writing about Engel, New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis 
found it ironic, even baffling, that Engel had provoked greater pub-
lic outcry than Baker v. Carr. 4 Lewis observed that the school 
prayer case had "so much less potential for real change in the coun-
try's social and political structure" than Baker. s 
Schempp, however, decided a broader issue than did Engel-
whether the state may require prayer in public schools. But surpris-
ingly the public responded more mildly to Schempp than to Engel. 6 
I will argue that the language and style of Justice Clark's opinion 
were not the primary causes. This, of course, does not mean that 
Clark's opinion had no impact whatsoever on the public's more pos-
itive reception of Schempp. Further, it implies neither that Justice 
Clark was misguided in writing for the readership of Time, rather 
than the Harvard Law Review, nor that the Court does wrong to 
tailor its message for its audience. Indeed, Tom Clark's public rela-
tions focus in Schempp in no way retarded doctrinal development of 
the religion clauses and may have advanced a more fundamental 
premise: that the Constitution is, after all, for all of us. In this 
respect Schempp modestly advances Professor Schauer's contention 
that sometimes the Court ought to talk to those who are listening. 
In this respect also, this Article celebrates Schempp on its twenty-
fifth anniversary. 
I 
The federal judiciary's insulated and somewhat precarious role 
in American government is the backdrop for Engel and Schempp. 
3. 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
4. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
5. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1962, at 12, col. 3. 
6. Schempp, because of its broader holding, affected religious practices in public school 
systems throughout the country. Although initial public response to Schempp was milder, 
many school systems did not comply with Schempp's holding. Even today, students pray in 
some public schools. Cf Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 459 U.S. 
1314 (1983) (holding unconstitutional an Alabama statute permitting public school teachers 
to lead their classes in prayer). For interesting studies of compliance with the Schempp deci· 
sian, seeK. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIO!'IS: FROM COURT 
POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE (1971); W. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE Pt.:BLIC ScHOOLS (1967); 
Katz, Pallerns of Compliance with the Schempp Decision, 14 J. PuB. L. 396 (1965). 
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A federal judge's life-tenure ideally guarantees that the judiciary 
neither will be accountable to the electorate nor swayed by the mo-
ment's passion. Ironically, however, the judiciary's insularity also 
produces its insecurity. Because the judiciary is not accountable to 
voters, its creative efforts in controversial cases raise questions 
about such decisionmaking in a democratic society and can lead 
disgruntled losers to demand that judges adjudicate, not legislate. 
Losers can do more than complain. Congress, for instance, can 
pare the Court's appellate jurisdiction; article III's grant of appel-
late jurisdiction to the Court qualifies that jurisdiction by "such Ex-
ceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. "7 
Congressional and executive disagreement with the Court's views 
also can spring efforts to manipulate the size of the Court. 
Although Roosevelt's court-packing plan was unsuccessful, other 
efforts have been more successful. After Chief Justice Marshall's 
departure during the Jackson administration, judges were added to 
counter Marshall's remaining influence. During the Civil War, 
Congress enlarged Court membership to ten in order to produce a 
greater margin of security after the Court's closely split decision 
upholding the blockade of the Confederacy. 8 Congress can also 
chill judicial activism and silence a misbehaving Justice through 
impeachment. 
The Court sometimes can foresee potential criticism and fore-
stall it. The Justices usually can recognize a controversial case and 
avoid it if they wish by refusing to grant certiorari or by using pru-
dential, ripeness, or jurisdictional grounds to avoid an obligatory 
appeal. When it chooses to hear a hard case, the Court has shown 
through previous decisions its belief that it can ease to some extent 
the predictable public outcry. In Brown v. Board of Education and 
in every school desegregation case for years thereafter, the Court 
tried through unanimity to mitigate public dissatisfaction with its 
decisions. Cooper v. Aaron is the best example. For the only time in 
recent history, each of the nine Justices signed the opinion. Indeed, 
in the text of the opinion, the Court stated "Since the first Brown 
opinion three new Justices have come to the Court. They are at one 
with the Justices still on the Court who participated in that basic 
decision as to its correctness, and that decision is now unanimously 
reaffirmed. "9 
The school prayer cases, both Engel and Schempp, exhibit all 
7. U.S. Const. art. III. § 2. Sec generally, Freund. Storms Over the Supreme Court, 69 
A.B.A.J. 1474 (1983) 
8. See Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and 
Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810. 851 (1974). 
9. 358 U.S. I, 19 (1958) 
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the foregoing features. The Supreme Court, faced with a controver-
sial issue and pummeled with public criticism, tried to soften the 
blows. The 1962 case, Engel, caused a furor which the Court ap-
parently did not foresee. The 1963 case, Schempp, stirred relatively 
little reaction. Shortly after the Court issued the opinion, Judge 
Irving R. Kaufman of the Second Circuit commented that Schempp 
was written "much more with an eye toward public perusal and in 
anticipation of public criticism," and that the milder reaction to 
Schempp "was largely due to the tone of the Court's opinions 
themselves." 1 o 
Judge Kaufman is at least half-right. The final opinion itself 
indicates Justice Clark sought to counter the public perception that 
the Supreme Court was undermining religion in America. We will 
see that the preliminary drafts are even more revealing. Kaufman's 
other claim, however, is dubious and largely irrelevant. To say that 
the crafting of an opinion predominantly determines the milder 
public response may simply be judicial chauvinism. Moreover, the 
causation question misplaces the proper focus. The real issue is 
whether Clark's opinion in Schempp addressed its readership's con-
cerns without undermining the Court's institutional obligation to 
consistent, doctrinal development. Before considering the Schempp 
opinion, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at Engel. 
II 
In 1951 the New York State Board of Regents recommended 
that New York public school children begin each school day by 
reciting a twenty-two word prayer composed by the regents: "Al-
mighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we 
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Coun-
try."II Although some school districts ignored the regents' recom-
mendation, Union Free School District Number 9 complied. Later, 
parents of ten students challenged the constitutionality of the state 
law authorizing the prayer. The New York Court of Appeals sus-
tained an order of the lower state courts permitting the prayer's use 
as long as a school district did not require student compliance. 12 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Black struck down the state 
law permitting the regents' prayer because the law violated the Es-
tablishment Clause of the first amendment. By focusing on the re-
10. Kaufman, The Supreme Court and Its Critics. ATLA,.TIC Mo,.THLY, Dec., 1963, at 
50. 
II. 370 U.S. at 422. 
12. 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961). 
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gents' authorship of the prayer, Black kept the Court's holding 
narrow: 
[W]e think that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an estab-
lishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the 
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American 
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. 13 
Black's opinion is interesting on two grounds. First, he cited 
no prior Establishment Clause case, but drew exclusively on histori-
cal documents and commentaries to show that the framers intended 
to prohibit all establishment of religion like the regents' prayer pro-
gram. Thus, Black gave no indication whether the Court's holding 
in Engel was consistent with prior Establishment Clause cases or 
marked a radical departure from them.14 Second, his opinion fur-
nished little guidance to lower courts, local governments, and 
school districts interested in the limits of the holding. In that way, 
the Engel majority opinion serves to illustrate Professor Schauer's 
contention that the Court rarely if ever directs its comments to its 
audience. Only footnote twenty-one provides any hint about En-
gel's outer limits: 
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with 
the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for 
our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Indepen-
dence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused an-
thems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or 
with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. 
Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unques-
tioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this 
instance. 15 
Justice Douglas's concurrence attempted to supply the direc-
tion missing from Black's opinion by painting with a broad brush.16 
"The point for decision," he asserted, "is whether the Government 
can constitutionally finance a religious exercise. Our system at the 
federal and state levels is presently honeycombed with such financ-
13. 370 U.S. at 425. 
14. As Professor Philip Kurland noted at the time, "[t]he primary authority relied upon 
by the petitioners was McCollum. The respondents rested largely on the long-continued 
existence of the practice of prayer in public places and on Zorach. Under the circumstances 
one might have anticipated that the Court would be required, at least, to reconcile the McCol-
~ fum and Zorach cases." Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signi-
fying . ... "1962 St.:P. CT. REV. I. 13. 
15. 370 U.S. at 435 n.21. Apparently, the decision to place this passage in footnote 
twenty-one resulted from compromise. As one commentator notes, "The exact sequence and 
details are uncertain. but the footnote apparently was written near the end of the opinion-
writing stage. There was difficulty in getting agreement on wording and where the words 
should be located." D. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 86 (1968). 
16. 370 U.S. at 437 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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ing. Nevertheless, I think it is an unconstitutional taking whatever 
form it takes." In a long footnote Douglas catalogued examples of 
possibly impermissible government financing of religion. These in-
cluded chaplains in the armed services, Bible reading in public 
schools, "In God We Trust" on coins, and tax exemptions for reli-
gious organizations. 
The response to the Engel decision was literally instantaneous 
and, consequently, uninformed. Within an hour or two of the deci-
sion's announcement, many congressmen and well-known religious 
leaders, despite not having read the opinion, responded to reporters' 
questions. The clergy had a mixed reaction; most Catholics op-
posed the decision, Jewish leaders approved it, and Protestant min-
isters divided along predictable lines.I 7 Francis Cardinal Spellman 
of New York made a typical statement: "I am shocked and fright-
ened that the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional a simple 
and voluntary declaration of belief in God by public school chil-
dren. The decision strikes at the very heart of the Godly tradition 
in which America's children have for so long been raised."Is Even 
more typical was an Atlanta clergyman's comment, calling the deci-
sion "the most terrible thing that's ever happened to us"-then ad-
mitting that he did not really know what the decision said.I 9 
Those congressmen who spoke went on the record quickly and, 
sensing a political bonanza, almost uniformly criticized the deci-
sion.2o Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia raged that the deci-
sion was "unconscionable" and "an outrageous edict."2 1 
Representative George W. Andrews of Alabama ranted, "They put 
the Negroes into the schools and now they have driven God out of 
them."22 Though most of the bluster blew in from the South, there 
was an occasional Norther. Congressman John B. Williams, a 
Democrat from Massachusetts, sensed-even though McCarthyism 
had largely run its political course-"a deliberately and carefully 
planned conspiracy to substitute materialism for spiritual values 
and thus to communize America. "23 
Congressional criticism took more substantial forms as well. 
On June 26, one day after the Court handed down Engel, members 
in both houses introduced bills to amend the Constitution. New 
17. See, e.g., Beaney & Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp 
on the Political Process, 13J. Pus. L., 475,482-83 (1964); Kurland, supra note 14; TIME, July 
6, 1962, at 8. 
18. Kurland, supra note 14, at 2 n.5. 
19. Time, supra note 17, at 8. 
20. See BEANEY & BEISER, supra note 17, at 479. 
21. 108 Cong. Rec. 11675 (1962). 
22. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1962, at 16. 
23. 108 Cong. Rec. 11734 (1962). 
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York Representative Frank J. Becker's amendment was typical: 
"Prayers may be offered in the course of any program in any public 
school or other public place in the United States."24 Florida's 
Haley unsuccessfully offered an amendment to a judiciary appropri-
ations bill to earmark funds to purchase "for the personal use of 
each justice a copy of the Holy Bible."2s On September 27, the 
House voted unanimously to place the motto, "In God We Trust" 
behind the speaker's desk.26 In all, twenty-two senators and fifty-
three representatives, most of them from the South, introduced con-
stitutional amendments responding to Engel.21 
Senator James Eastland's Judiciary Committee conducted 
hearings on prayer in public school. 28 Although the hearings osten-
sibly focused on the school prayer controversy, several senators 
used them as a general opportunity to criticize the Court. The sena-
tors' criticism of Engel focused on Douglas's one-man concurrence. 
While one might assume their focus shows that Douglas was the 
primary demon motivating the public outrage over Engel, this as-
sumption ignores two important considerations. First, public com-
mentary began before anyone even knew Douglas had written a 
concurrence, or at least before anyone knew what it said. Second, 
the senators' focus on Douglas's concurrence in the Eastland hear-
ings shows only that, by then, the senators had found something to 
complain about. Douglas's concurrence legitimatized the early out-
rage, rather than motivating it. 
Public response was one-sidedly critical. In the first weeks af-
ter Engel, the Supreme Court received five thousand letters de-
nouncing the Court's decision.29 In a Gallup Poll, nearly eighty 
percent favored prayers in public schools.Jo 
Press reaction divided along political lines. As one might ex-
pect, newspapers such as the New York Times, Washington Post, 
and Chicago Sun-Times defended the decision, while the Hearst 
newspapers, the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times criti-
cized the decision. 31 The press caused perhaps greater damage 
through its incompetent interpretation of the decision and aggres-
sive attempts to fan the flames. Headlines the morning after the 
24. Hearings on Prayer in Public Schools and Other Matters Before the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Senate 
Hearings]. 
25. 108 Cong. Rec. 14360 (1962). 
26. 1d. at 21102. 
27. BEANEY & BEISER, supra note 27, at 479. 
28. 1962 Senate Hearings, supra note 24. 
29. D. GREY, supra note 15, at 83. 
30. See Hachten, Journalism and the Prayer Decision, 1962 CoLUM. JoURN. REV. 7. 
31. BEANEY & BEISER, supra note 17, at 481. 
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decision obscured the narrowness of the Court's explicit holding: 
"Supreme Court Outlaws Prayers in Public Schools" (Detroit Free 
Press); "Possible End to Christian, Jewish Holy Day Activity in 
Public Schools as Court Bans N.Y. Prayer" (Baltimore Sun); "No 
Prayers in Schools, Supreme Court Orders" (Dallas Morning 
News).32 Time Magazine noted shortly after the Schempp decision, 
"Last year's New York prayer decision stirred widespread alarm-
not so much for what it said as for what people thought it said. 
Misled by headlines, many thought that the court had all but or-
dered an end to all ties between government and religion .... "33 
Arguably worse than its misinterpretation was the press' solici-
tation of uninformed criticism. Starting immediately after the deci-
sion's announcement and continuing through the rest of the week, 
the press departed from wire service interpretations of the decision 
and actively sought good quotes.34 Commentators have noted that 
the media solicited these colorful quotes without regard for whether 
the public figure knew what the opinion said.3s 
The intensity of public response flabbergasted almost everyone, 
including the Court. Departing from the Justices' traditional si-
lence, Justice Clark at an ABA convention in August 1962 derided 
the press' misinformed treatment of the case.36 CBS found the pub-
lic outcry sufficiently volatile to broadcast a two-part series in prime 
time, Storm Over the Supreme Court.37 
III 
Almost one year later the Supreme Court decided the issue 
that some of the press and public mistakenly believed it already had 
resolved: whether a state law may require a school to begin the 
school day with readings from the Bible or recitation of prayer. 
Schempp actually decided two consolidated cases. Edward 
Schempp was challenging the Pennsylvania law requiring that "[a]t 
least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read without comment, 
at the opening of each public school on each school day," but al-
lowing children to be excused upon written request from their par-
32. See also Newland, Press Coverage of the United States Supreme Court, 17 W. POLIT-
ICAL Q. 15, 29 (1964 ). 
33. TIME, June 28, 1963, at 13. 
34. Newland, supra note 32, at 29. 
35. E.g., Storm Over the Supreme Court 69 (CBS Television broadcast, Feb. 20, 1963 
and March 13, 1963) (transcript on file at University of Texas at Austin Law Library) [here-
inafter CBS Broadcast). 
36. N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1962, at 9, col. I (summary of remarks by Justice Clark at the 
Commonwealth Club, San Francisco). 
37. CBS Broadcast, supra note 35. 
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ents. In Murray v. Curlett, William Murray and his mother 
Madalyn Murray were challenging Baltimore's rule providing for 
"reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or 
the use of the Lord's Prayer." 
In an eight to one decision, the Court struck down both stat-
utes, Justice Stewart dissenting as he had done in Engel. Justice 
Clark wrote the majority opinion-an opinion noteworthy primar-
ily because it shows Clark's great concern over the reaction that 
Engel had spurred. Clark wrote the opinion in five parts. By exam-
ining the style chosen for the consolidated cases and by looking 
closely at each part of Clark's opinion in earlier drafts and final 
form, we can see how Clark sought to minimize public reaction. 
1. The Style. Immediately striking is the Court's choice of 
Schempp as the style for the consolidated cases, despite the fact that 
Murrays' case had received docket number 119 while Schempp's 
case had received docket number 142. By choosing Schempp, a 
Unitarian, to be the captioned plaintiff, rather than Murray and her 
son, who were staunch atheists, the Justices showed their concern 
with the widespread perception that the Supreme Court had em-
barked on a crusade to undermine religion. 
A review of all consolidated cases resulting in full opinions for 
the 1961, 1962, and 1963 Terms supports this view. Of thirty-five 
opinions deciding consolidated cases, all but two opinions, other 
than Schempp, used the lowest numbered case as the styled case. In 
the two other exceptions, the Court explained why it had varied 
from the general practice of naming the opinion after the lowest 
numbered case. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de 
HondurasJs decided three consolidated cases, docketed 91, 93, and 
107. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, explained that the 
Court selected number 107 as the style and focused on 107's facts 
because it presented "the question in better perspective, and we 
have chosen it as the vehicle for our adjudication on the merits." 
The other opinion, Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,39 
decided two consolidated cases, docketed 489 and 490. Here also 
the Court revealed why it chose Number 490 as the styled case and 
why it focused on 490's facts. Justice Goldburg explained, "The 
two appeals, one involving the Upjohn Co. and one involving Eli 
Lilly & Co., were considered together in the Ohio courts. For sim-
plicity we state only the facts of the Lilly case."4o 
Thus, a review of the 1962 Term, when Schempp was decided, 
38. 372 U.S. 10. 16 (1963). 
39. 377 u.s. 386, 387 (1964). 
40. !d. at 387. 
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and the terms immediately preceding and following the 1962 Term 
strongly suggest that styling consolidated cases with the later dock-
eted case is both aberrational and purposive. The Court's similar 
action in Brown v. Board of Education buttresses this conclusion. 
Explaining why the Court granted certiorari to a handful of school 
segregation cases and chose Brown as the lead case, Justice Clark 
noted later, "We felt it was much better to have representative cases 
from different parts of the country, ... and so we consolidated them 
and made Brown the first so that the whole question would not 
smack of being a purely Southern one."4J 
2. The Facts in Each Case. Clark's treatment of the facts in 
his rough drafts best illustrates his sensitivity to public opinion. 
Probably reacting to legislators' and religious leaders' comments 
that Engel would lead inevitably to a godless America, Clark con-
sidered burying the Murrays' atheism. One of his first handwritten 
drafts contained no factual discussion of the Murray case at all.42 
Clark mentioned it only once and in passing: "While none of the 
parties to either this action or its companion case, Wm. J. Murray 
III eta/ v. John N. Curlett eta/, No. 119, has ever questioned these 
basic conclusions, ... others continue to question their history, 
logic, and efficacy." In a mostly-typed subsequent draft,43 Clark 
included a handwritten insert about the "numbered case," contain-
ing a factual and procedural discussion of the Murrays' case. But 
here he made no reference to the Murrays' atheism. The Murrays 
are mentioned by name only once: "Mrs. Murray, one of the peti-
tioners, requested and the respondent Board granted an excuse for 
her son, Wm. Murray Ill, from attending the exercises." More-
over, Clark provided only a brief, almost vacuous version of the 
Murrays' contentions: "Petitioners contend that both the Estab-
lishment and the Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are 
violated by the require (sic) rule of the Board." By comparison, in 
the same draft Clark's summary of the State of Maryland's re-
sponses to the Murrays' claims is detailed. 44 
41. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 540 (1975). 
42. Clark, J., Draft Opinion (exact date unknown, probably April, 1963) (Tom C. Clark 
Papers, Tarleton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin) [hereinafter Draft Opinion 1]. 
43. Clark, J., Draft Opinion (exact date unknown, probably mid-April, 1963) (Tom C. 
Clark Papers, Tarleton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin) [hereinafter Draft Opin-
ion 2). 
44. The second draft describes the State of Maryland's contentions as follows: 
The state counters that the Bible reading is not in the form of religious instruction 
or service but is used as an inspirational appeal to inculcate moral and ethical 
precepts of value to the beginning of the school day; it contends that the use of the 
Bible sources is neither the composition nor the sanctioning of an "'official prayer."' 
As to the Free Exercise Clause they claim the right to be excused removes any 
coercion from the exercises; and finally the state says that the striking down of the 
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In a third, entirely typed draft, Clark included a factual and 
procedural discussion of the Murrays' case essentially identical to 
the second draft's discussion.4s But here Clark deleted the second 
draft's brief reference to the Murrays by name and referred to them 
only as "petitioners." Clark's only comments about the Murrays 
were that the "petitioners, after exhausting administrative remedies, 
filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking a mandamus com-
manding the Board to rescind the rule"; and that their complaint 
contended the Maryland rule violated both the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 
For whatever reason, whether on his own initiative or at an-
other Justice's urging, Clark eventually decided that any attempt to 
hide the Murrays' atheism from public view would be either futile 
or improper. In the published opinion Clark noted that Madalyn 
Murray and her son, William J. Murray III, were indeed "professed 
atheists." Clark also put some flesh on the earlier drafts' bare-bones 
summary of the Murrays' contentions by explaining that the Mur-
rays' petition particularized their "atheistic beliefs," and by citing a 
lengthy passage from their brief. In it, the Murrays contended that 
the Maryland rule violated their first amendment rights: 
in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief as against 
non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority; it 
pronounces belief in God as the source of all moral and spiritual values, and thereby 
renders sinister, alien and suspect the beliefs and ideals of your Petitioners, promot-
ing doubt and question of their morality, good citizenship and good faith46 
Even so, Clark's description of the facts and contentions of 
Murray v. Curlett in the published opinion, though honest and more 
detailed than in his drafts, pales as compared to his description of 
Schempp's facts. The facts of Schempp run six pages in the final 
opinion, while Murray's facts run slightly more than one page. 
That six to one ratio was a holdover from the previous drafts.47 
exercise will forestall the elimination in any form of that Church-State relation 
which saturates and enriches innumerable facets of our public and private life. 
!d. at 2-3. 
Interestingly, in the published opinion, this detailed description of the State's conten-
tions is eliminated. The published opinion says only that the State of Maryland demurred to 
the Murrays' petition. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 212. 
45. Clark, J., Draft Opinion (dated May. 1963) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarleton Law 
Library, University of Texas at Austin) [hereinafter Draft Opinion 3]. 
46. 374U.S.at212. 
47. Indeed in both Clark's second and third drafts, the facts of Murray are sandwiched 
and seemingly buried between a description of Schempp's facts. In Drafts 2 and 3, Clark 
placed Murray's facts after what appears as the second paragraph in the published opinion 
but before what appears as the remaining factual description of Schempp's facts. In Drafts 2 
and 3, the second paragraph of the published opinion and a description of Murray's facts 
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3. "[O]ur national life reflects a religious people . .. "4s In 
Part II of the published opinion Justice Clark set out to dispel any 
notion that the Supreme Court viewed religion antagonistically. In 
Zorach v. Clausen, he noted, the Court specifically recognized that 
"[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a 
Supreme Being. "49 Clark approvingly pointed to the prayer open-
ing each session of Congress and references to the grace of God in 
Supreme Court proceedings. 
Part II serves no analytic function. The importance of religion 
to most Americans is theoretically irrelevant to what the Free Exer-
cise and Establishment Clauses require of government in its relation 
to religion. Given Clark's concerns, of course, the Court's acknowl-
edgment of religion's value was highly relevant. Not surprisingly, 
Part II of the published opinion survived essentially unchanged 
from its initial prominent place in the first handwritten draftso 
4. The Reach of the First Amendment. Clark made two 
points in Part III, both of which he considered settled by earlier 
Court decisions. First, the first amendment extends to the states 
through the fourteenth amendment.st Second, the Establishment 
Clause prohibits any union between church and state, and not sim-
ply prohibition of governmental preference of one religion over 
another. 
Most notable in this part, as well in Part IV, is the decisiveness 
of Clark's diction. In Part III, Clark emphasized that the Court 
"has decisively settled" and "repeatedly reaffirmed" the fourteenth 
amendment question. Moreover, the Court answered the Establish-
ment Clause question "unequivocally" and has "firmly maintained" 
that position. Clark sprinkled similar modifiers throughout Part 
IV: "for a unanimous Court," "without dissent," and "so univer-
sally recognized." These modifiers all appear initially in Clark's 
first drafts and are carried forward essentially unedited. 52 
5. A Wholesome Neutrality. Part IV, which contains the 
meat of Clark's legal reasoning, is also the least satisfying. Part IV's 
function in the legal argument is to explain the interrelationship of 
the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause and the "whole-
comprise the opinion's introduction. with the third paragraph of the published opinion begin-
ning Part I of the drafts. 
48. 374 U.S. at 213. 
49. 374 U.S. at 213 (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. 306. 313 (1952)). 
SO. The only major editorial change was to move the citation of Judge Alphonso Taft's 
neutrality remarks in Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati from Part II to Part III. See 
Draft Opinions I & 2. 
51. 374 U.S. at 215-16. 
52. See Draft Opinions I, 2 & 3. 
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some neutrality" that the relationship engenders. What appears, 
however, is a rambling string of quotations from earlier first amend-
ment religion cases. Clark omits any discussion of the facts or hold-
ings of any of these cases, with the exception of Engel. In Clark's 
first rough draft, he included a discussion of the reasoning of Ever-
son v. Board of Education.sJ He included it again in the second 
draft but then crossed it out.s4 Also in Clark's first draft he ex-
plained the motivation for the separate dissents of Black, Frank-
furter, and Jackson in the controversial Zorach case.ss In the 
second draft he deleted the entire discussion of the Zorach 
dissents. s6 
Clark's decision to omit these passages in the final opinion is 
understandable. To discuss the cases intelligently, Clark would 
have had to engage in a fairly sophisticated legal analysis. In Ever-
son by a five to four vote and Zorach by a six to three vote, the 
Court had found no first amendment violation. Everson, holding 
that a New Jersey board of education could reimburse catholic 
schools for transporting their students to and from school was, in 
Justice Douglas' view, wrongly decided.57 And Douglas had voted 
with Everson's five-person majority. In Zorach the Court permitted 
New York City to release students from the school grounds during 
school hours so that they could go to religious centers for instruc-
tion. Squaring Zorach with Engel and Schempp would have in-
volved detailed analysis, the kind of detail one finds in Justice 
Brennan's lengthy concurrence in Schempp. 
Any extended discussion of the prior Establishment Clause 
cases would have detracted from Clark's mission: to create for the 
public the illusion of "unequivocal" and "unanimous" support on 
religion issues. Not surprisingly, in the final opinion Clark men-
tioned only the facts of Engel, a case that most clearly supports the 
Court's decision in Schempp. Even here Clark tried to deflect some 
of the criticism earlier leveled at El'gel for failing to cite a case. 
Clark noted approvingly that the principles in Engel were "so uni-
versally recognized that the Court, without the citation of a single 
case ... reaffirmed them." 
6. The Establishment Clause Test. Part V contains the opin-
ion's only contribution to the doctrinal development of the Estab-
lishment Clause. It articulates for the first time a test to be applied 
53. 330 U.S. I (194 7). 
54. Draft Opinion I, at 13-14; Draft Opinion 2, at 15. 
55. Draft Opinion I, at 16-17. 
56. Draft Opinion 2, at 19. 
57. Engel, 370 U.S. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The Everson case seems in retro-
spect to be out of line with the First Amendment."). 
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to all Establishment Clause cases. The two-part test "may be stated 
as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the en-
actment? If either is the advancement of religion then the enact-
ment exceeds the scope of legislative powers." In previous cases the 
Court, without stating a formal test, had applied one that was essen-
tially identical to Clark's. In McGowan v. Maryland,ss for example, 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of Sunday Blue Laws after 
noting that the "present purpose and effect of most of them is to 
provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens." Nonetheless, Clark's 
articulation in Part V of the "purpose and effect" test delineated for 
the first time a uniform rule or standard for approaching religion 
cases.s9 
Part V also contains an attempt by Clark to prevent the kind of 
sweeping interpretations of Schempp that the public had attributed 
to Engel. Clark's effort, however, is unobtrusive and meager; it lies 
buried in footnote 10: 
We are not of course presented with and therefore do not pass upon a situation 
such as military service, where the Government regulates that temporal and geo-
graphic environment of individuals to a point that, unless it permits voluntary reli-
gious services to be conducted with the use of government facilities, military 
personnel would be unable to engage in the practice of their faiths. 
Earlier drafts indicate Justice Clark at one point in the drafting 
process was much more wary that the public might read Schempp 
broadly to prohibit any interaction between church and state. For 
example, in his first handwritten draft, Clark spoke more affirma-
tively, and in the draft's body: 
We take it that the Chaplain service is in a different category. There, only 
adults are involved and the service is purely voluntary. The soldier often has no 
58. 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961). The McGowan Court also employed "purpose and effect" 
language to describe the Everson Court's holding: "But the [Everson] Court found that the 
purpose and effect of the statute in question was general 'public welfare legislation ... .' " !d. 
at 443-44. 
59. Justice Clark's development of the "purpose and effect" test did not come easy. In 
Draft Opinion I, Clark's test for Establishment Clause cases read as follows: "In short, the 
Establishment Clause prohibits both federal and state governments from performing or aid-
ing in the performance of a solely religious activity, whether coercion be present or absent." 
Draft Opinion I, at 19. In Drafts 2 and 3, Clark stated only a "purpose" test: 
The test is a simple one, namely, what is the primary end of the enactment? If that 
end derives from the advancement of religion the enactment is beyond all legislative 
power. That is to say there must be a legitimate and substantial legislative purpose 
other than the religious one. 
Draft Opinion 2, at 23; Draft Opinion 3, at 25. 
Sometime between the third draft and June 10, 1963, Justice Clark concluded that a 
purely subjective, "motivation" test was insufficient. In a fourth draft circulated to the other 
Justices on June 10, 1963, Clark articulated the "purpose and effect" test found in the pub-
lished opinion. Clark. J., Draft Opinion, at 19 (dated June 10, 1963) (Tom C. Clark Papers, 
Tarleton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin). 
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service available and being under command would be deprived of his religious activ-
ity had the government not made a Chaplain available. In the Congress the Chap-
lain's prayer is not by law but by action of each body independently.60 
345 
In the same draft at an earlier point, Clark first wrote and then 
deleted that "[i]t also seems appropriate to denote what is not in-
volved here." He then began discussing the constitutionality of reli-
gious services for the military, before ending the discussion in 
midsentence. 
Clark's desire to curb broad readings of Schempp is another 
illustration of his sensitivity to public perception. The Schempp de-
cision affected an entire nation's school practices. Clark wanted to 
allay the fears expressed after Engel that the Supreme Court was 
conducting a vendetta against religion. Reading the Schempp deci-
sion as an ordinary example of Court reasoning, therefore, misses 
the point. Clark's opinion primarily functions as a defensive at-
tempt to temper the expected unfriendly response. 
For whatever reason, the reaction to Schempp was "relatively 
mild" and "nothing compared to that of 1962. "6I The Court re-
ceived only one hundred letters from the public, in sharp contrast to 
the five thousand letters the Justices received after Engel.62 Reli-
gious reaction again was mixed, but on balance favored the deci-
sion.63 The initial congressional reaction, though reflecting 
opposition, showed more restraint.M A few continued to rave. Sen-
ator A. Willis Robertson of Virginia argued that "we will become as 
Godless a nation as is the Soviet Union." Representative O'Konski 
of Wisconsin suggested mental tests for the Justices. 
Legislative activity, however, increased. Congressmen intro-
duced twice as many amendments to the Constitution as they had 
after Engel. By March 24, 1964, they numbered one hundred forty-
six. Most of these amendments fizzled immediately. Representa-
tive Becker's efforts, however, made more noise. Though he never 
succeeded in getting his bill out of the House Judiciary Committee, 
at one time he obtained one hundred seventy of the two hundred 
eighteen signatures necessary to discharge the bill from commit-
tee.6s Committee Chairman Emmanuel Celler of New York reluc-
tantly agreed, after stalling for months, to schedule hearings. 
Unlike supporters of Engel during the Eastland hearings, the anti-
Becker people managed to muster scholarly and religious support 
60. Draft Opinion I, at 20. 
61. TIME, June 28, 1963, at 13-14. 
62. D. GREY, supra note 15, at 83. 
63. N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963 at I, col. 7. 
64. BEANEY & BEISER, supra note 17, at 491. 
65. /d. at 495. 
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for the Schempp decision; whether this support mattered is hard to 
say, but the Becker amendment died a sorry death in June, 1964.66 
The press also reacted more favorably, provided more informa-
tion and published fewer colorful reactions. 67 The Chicago Trib-
une, for example, noted that "Clark's controlling decision . . . 
sought to allay fears that the court was moving toward a banning of 
all religious aspects in government, such as the maintenance of mili-
tary chapels and chaplains and the opening of sessions of Congress 
with prayers. "6s Although most papers, as they had in Engel, im-
mediately sought reaction from religious and political leaders, the 
published stories presented more balance. The Los Angeles Times 
headline read, "Religious Leaders in LA Differ Widely on School 
Prayer Ruling. "69 The Chicago Tribune's headline stated, "Clergy-
men are Divided on the Issue. "7o Whether that mixed reaction de-
rived from more balanced reporting or whether it reflected a change 
in perspective by religious and political leaders is debatable. Proba-
bly both factors contributed to the reporting. Criticism of the press 
after Engel probably inhibited to some extent aggressive solicitation 
of outlandish remarks. 7 1 Equally true, there simply were not as 
many outraged individuals. It should be noted, however, that the 
published reactions of religious and political leaders, whether 
favorable or unfavorable, were as uninformed after Schempp as they 
had been after Engel. Few of the respondents actually read the 
opinion before they expressed their viewpoint. n 
IV 
Did Clark's optmon substantially contribute to the public's 
milder reaction to Schempp? Judge Irving R. Kaufman is not alone 
in thinking that Clark's opinion controlled the response. Time 
Magazine, for example, commented that the less violent reaction to 
Schempp was owed to the "Supreme Court's much more careful 
disclaimer. "73 
Judge Kaufman is probably wrong. His thesis assumes that 
violent public outcry to Engel came after thoughtful perusal of that 
opinion, and, moreover, that the milder response to Schempp came 
66. !d. at 498-501. 
67. D. GREY, supra note 15, at 95. 
68. Chicago Tribune, June 18. 1963 at I, col. 8. 
69. L.A. Times, June 18, 1963, at I, col. 3. 
70. Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1963, at I, col. 7. 
71. See. e.g .. Hachten, supra note 30; Newland, supra note 32. 
72. See. e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1963, at 13, col. 8 ("It was obvious they could not 
have read the explanations.") (quoting Brennan, J.). 
73. TIME, June 28, 1963, at 14. 
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after reading Clark's opinion. But as Justice Brennan bemoaned 
two months after the Court issued Schempp, "There were four ma-
jority opinions which filled 109 printed pages. Yet within two hours 
the critics were in print saying the Court was wrong. It was obvious 
they could not have read the explanations."74 
Judge Kaufman's thesis arguably depends only on the public 
getting accurate information about the opinion from the press, not 
on the public reading the opinions themselves. Even if one grants 
this point, however, his theory still fails. It fails because it neglects 
the immediacy of public response to both Engel and Schempp. The 
press actively solicited responses from sources who were ignorant of 
the cases' explicit holdings and reasoning. Immediately after Engel 
the press was able to find a good story. Right after Schempp, how-
ever, fewer public figures were willing to deride the Court as godless 
and communistic. The press's success in Engel and failure in 
Schempp in obtaining good quotes did not depend on the Court's 
differing analyses. 
The better explanation for Schempp's milder reaction is that 
people were ready for the second school prayer case. The shock 
had worn off. 75 A year had elapsed since the Court decided Engel. 
Although the Court's holding in Engel was narrow, everyone per-
ceived it to be at least as broad as Schempp's holding. In effect, the 
public already believed that the Court had outlawed prayer. The 
press had fostered this perception through exaggerated headlines 
and uninformed editorials and lead stories. But knowledgeable 
spokesmen also produced this impression. Those who understood 
Engel properly foresaw its implications and commented accord-
ingly. 76 Moreover, between Engel and Schempp many church lead-
ers had commented favorably and prepared their laity for the 
Schempp decision. 77 Thus, Schempp simply came as no surprise. 
The storm that Engel produced had dissipated by the time Schempp 
was issued because of Engel's initial ferocity. 
v 
Although the language of Justice Clark's opinion was not prin-
cipally responsible for the public's more accepting response to 
Schempp, by no means should it be criticized as a failed effort at 
public relations. The press eventually-that evening or the follow-
74. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30. 1963. at 13, col. 8. 
75. Many commentators agree. E.g., D. GREY, supra note 15, at 84; BEANEY & 
BEISER, supra note 17, at 485. 
76. See, e.g .. Kurland, supra note 14. 
77. BEANEY & BEISER, supra note 17, at 485: Time, June 28, 1963, at 14. 
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ing morning-delivered Clark's intended message. Some newspa-
pers, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Los 
Angeles Times, and Des Moines Register, printed the entire opin-
ion. 7 8 Many newspapers printed substantial excerpts. 79 In general, 
the press coverage focused largely on the language of the Justices' 
opinions, particularly Justice Clark's majority opinion. In that re-
spect, Clark's effort was a success. By writing a relatively short 
opinion-it covers only twenty-two pages-and by dispensing, for 
the most part, with traditional legal analysis, Justice Clark pro-
duced an opinion that could be read and understood by those who 
would be most affected by its ruling, parents sending their children 
to public schools. 
Moreover, Clark's lay-oriented opinion was also successful 
doctrinally. Indeed, rather than retarding doctrinal development of 
the establishment clause, Clark's opinion moved establishment 
clause doctrine a step the Court had not previously taken. By an-
nouncing the two-part "purpose and effect" test, Justice Clark es-
tablished an analytical framework the Court since then has applied. 
Since Schempp, the Court has modified Clark's test. In Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,so a 1971 case, the Court altered Clark's test by adding a 
third wing: that a government enactment must not foster an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.si But Lemon's three-
part test, which the Court continues to apply,sz adds another con-
sideration to Clark's basic approach.sJ 
The school prayer decisions presented the Court with an unu-
sual opportunity, seldom present in other hard cases. Because En-
gel actually had decided a narrow question, the Court was able to 
take a second shot in Schempp at deflecting criticism of the Court 
and thereby soothing the citizenry. A review of Justice Clark's 
drafts and published opinion suggests he leaped at the opportunity. 
Those documents indicate Clark chose his words to play well in the 
press, if not in volume 374 of the United States Reports. 
Twenty-five years later, one is hard pressed to name any other 
Supreme Court opinion decided since Schempp that has attempted 
to address the concerns of the American people. The Court's ex-
78. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1963, at 28-29; Washington Post, June 18, 1963, at A-14; L.A. 
Times, June 18, 1963, at 2, 14-16; Des Moines Register, June 18, 1963, at 4-5. 
79. E.g., Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1963, at 1-2; Dallas Morning News, June 18, 1963, 
at I; Houston Post, June 18, 1963, at I & 5; Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, June 17, 1963, at 
1-2; Rocky Mountain News, June 18, 1963, at 3. 
80. 403 U.S. 602 (1971 ). 
81. /d. at 613. 
82. SeeR. RoTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YoUNG, TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDCRE, § 21.3. at 344-45, 353 (1986). 
83. 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
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cuse cannot be that no case since Schempp has affected us as signifi-
cantly as the school prayer cases did. Nor, as the American 
people's curiosity about the Bark confirmation hearings reveals, can 
the Justices claim that the public is unconcerned with the workings 
of the Court. Schempp should remind us all that little is lost, and 
much can be gained, by writing for one's readership. 
